The way it reads the corrosion in the fuel
control unit caused a fuel starvation?  It appears that it had already happened
at least two times previously but was intermittent and he never found the
cause.

hi there



NTSB REPORT ON A 2012 FATAL ACCIDENT IN A 4P TURBINE

A factual report on the Feb. 3, 2012, crash that killed
Micron Technology CEO Steve Appleton released Aug. 12 by the NTSB sheds new
light on the circumstances, though a determination of probable cause may still
be months away.

Investigators found no evidence of a
mechanical failure that would have precluded normal operation, though there was
significant corrosion in the fuel control unit; NTSB investigators note
that Appleton, who purchased the aircraft from a previous owner less than two
months before the crash, was relatively unfamiliar with the complex systems of
an aircraft that Appleton himself described as "squirrely." While
insurers required Lancair-specific training at the time, there is no evidence
cited in the report that
Appleton
had sought such training.

Appleton’s
Lancair IV-TP appears to have suffered a power loss shortly after a
takeoff attempted minutes after a rejected takeoff; witnesses saw it pitch
steeply and crash seconds after liftoff.

AN ATP WILL NOT KEEP YOU SAFE IN A LANCAIR -
if you have not had proper training

Appleton
held an airline transport pilot certificate with category ratings for
multiengine land, multiengine sea, and single-engine land airplanes, along with
various type ratings, and had private pilot priviliges for single-engine
seaplanes. He had logged more than 3,600 hours by the time he prepared for his
final flight, though the NTSB report notes that flight data recovered from the
aircraft indicates
Appleton had logged less than 14 hours in the aircraft
he bought from the previous owner in December 2011.

 

Data recovered from the
electronic flight information system, recording in detail the accident flight
as well as previous flights, correlates to witness accounts and other
evidence. Following a rejected takeoff, Appleton
requested a departure clearance at Boise Air
Terminal/Gowen Field in
Boise,
Idaho, shortly before 9 a.m., the
report states. The EFIS data recorded a sharp drop in engine torque soon after
liftoff, corresponding to the time
Appleton
notified the tower of his intention to turn back to the airport. During the
last 16 seconds of the flight, which reached a maximum altitude of 325 feet
above ground level, engine torque decreased to 14 percent—well below the normal
operating range. A post-crash examination uncovered corrosion within the fuel
control unit,

WOULD YOU TURN BACK
TO THE RUNWAY AT 300 FEET ABOVE THE AIRPORT? -IN A LANCAIR 4/4P/4PT

though the report notes that while
“numerous parts could not be examined due to the condition of the unit
(corroded) precluding their removal,” there was “no evidence of pre impact
mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation.”

Investigators interviewed experts
including an engineer formerly employed by Lancair, who said the aircraft
(modified to accommodate a turboprop engine) had a dramatically higher wing
loading than the original piston model, in the range of 40 to 45 pounds per
square foot. The turboprop modifications exacerbated the aircraft’s
“already-existing aggressive stall characteristics,” making the Lancair IV-TP a
“challenging
airplane to fly, which without adequate training, makes it a dangerous airplane
because it was not designed for such a high-horsepower engine.”

A company pilot who had flown with Appleton in the accident aircraft told NTSB investigators
that 
Appleton
was “unfamiliar with the panel, which made the airplane even more challenging.”

UNFAMILIAR WITH THE
PANEL?

The former Lancair engineer told
investigators that a pilot has very little time to react to a power reduction
during or immediately after takeoff: Without an abrupt pitch correction (to
reduce the angle of attack), the airplane would become “unrecoverable” within 5
seconds after a power loss during the initial climb. The engineer opined that
the aircraft would stall at more than 80 knots indicated, with a tendency to
drop a wing, and told investigators that he advises pilots to use a decision
altitude of 1,500 feet agl, landing straight-ahead in case of any power loss
below that altitude.

The data, along with witness accounts
and radio transcripts, shows
Appleton
attempted to turn back.

Appleton’s
death drew significant
media attention, and some questioned whether key corporate employees should
fly general aviation aircraft. AOPA Foundation President Bruce Landsberg noted,
days after the accident, that the Lancair has a heavily loaded wing, and higher
stall speed than comparable certificated aircraft.

“Does this make Lancairs bad aircraft? Not in
my view. But before flying one pilots must understand the nature of the animal
they’re dealing with,” Landsberg wrote.

 

hi there, again

you know, the MU2 had a
high rate of accidents attributed to the high wing loading and different flight
attributes. did not make it a bad airplane; just a plane that needed a properly
trained pilot. Likewise the Lancair 4 series.

(the MU2 autopilot
problem is another story; another time)

 

a sad loss of a good
person and a good airplane

 

peter